Moral Discipline and Communal Justice in Theravāda Buddhism: The Ethical Significance of the Bhikkhu Pātimokkha

Abstract

This article examines the relationship between moral discipline and communal justice in the Theravāda Bhikkhu Pātimokkha. It uses qualitative textual analysis and philosophical reconstruction of selected rules, their explanatory discussions, and associated procedures for settling disciplinary issues. The selected cases concern intention in theft and false speech, responsibility for learning the rules, confession, unfounded accusation, trustworthy lay testimony, and the limits of collective settlement. The analysis distinguishes ethical evaluation, liability under a specified rule, procedural validity, and evidential justification. It finds that responsibility extends from the monk whose conduct is examined to the accusers and adjudicators who interpret testimony, classify an offence, and authorize its consequences. Confession can support correction, but an admission must not be treated as establishing conditions that the person has not acknowledged. Similarly, collective agreement does not independently establish either factual accuracy or legitimate procedure. The study’s results reflect a qualified restorative interpretation: some disciplinary responses allow for rehabilitation and further training, whereas grave offences and procedural restrictions place limits on restoration and repair. Reinstatement of monastic standing also differs from repairing harm experienced by others. The article contributes a framework for understanding communal judgment as morally assessable conduct within the discipline itself. Its conclusions concern normative textual standards and philosophical implications, rather than measured contemporary institutional compliance or social outcomes